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Let us be frank. Evil still stalks the planet. It may have no ideology
more complicated than bloodlust; no program more complex than
economic plunder or military aggrandizement. But it is evil all the
same. And wherever there are forces that would destroy ihe human
spirit and diminish human potential they must be recognized and
they must be countered.
Just as the world's democracies banded together to advance the cause
of freedom in the face of totalitarianism, might we not now unite to
impose civilized standards of behavior on those who flout every
measure of human decency? Are we not nearing a point in world
history where civilized nations can in unison prosecute crimes against
humanity, such as those now defacing Somalia and Bosnia?
In my view the time has come for the world community to behave as
such. It is not enough to provide emergency assistance to victims of
tyranny. We must look for ways to prevent victimization in the first
place. What Ipropose, then, is nothing less than a humanitarian vel-
vet glove backed by a steel fist of military force.
- Ronald Reagan,
Address to the Oxford Union Society,
December 4, 1992.1
I. Introduction
The international community is now committed to the creation
of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal (Tribunal). A convention gov-
erning its creation was adopted by U.N. member States in Rome in
1998.' If all goes according to schedule, the Tribunal could be con-
1. A SHINING CITY: THE LEGACY OF RONALD REAGAN 184-186 (D. Eric Felten
ed., 1998).
2. See Elizabeth Neuffer, U.N. Creates Permanent Court for War Crimes, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., July 18, 1998, at A10 (the United States is not among the signa-
tories); see also Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Asks for Limits on World Court, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., July 10, 1998, at A16 ("Washington's primary objection is that
American soldiers might be vulnerable to politically motivated charges."); Alessan-
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vened in Den Haag by the millennium.' This will be the culmination
of a project that can trace its beginnings to World War II, if not ear-
lier Ideally, it will represent a significant advance in the mecha-
nisms of international peace and justice.
Regrettably, the Tribunal's operating charter will most likely
mirror the charters of the Yugoslav and Rwandan International War
Crimes Tribunals, both of which are currently in operation. In sharp
contrast to the war crimes courts convened after World War II, the
Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals have been failures. Any permanent
institution modeled after their precedents will most likely fail as well.
The Yugoslav and Rwandan war crimes courts failed for several
reasons. First, they do not contribute in the slightest to the regenera-
tion of Rwandan or Yugoslavian civil society. When the tribunals
cease operation, Yugoslavia and Rwanda will be no better, and quite
possibly much worse, than they were before. Second, these tribunals
lack the capacity to apprehend and prosecute the major perpetrators
of war crimes. Instead, they spend their time desultorily prosecuting
prison guards and minor lieutenants, while the Great Powers dither
over whether to risk capturing indicted wartime leaders.' Third, the
tribunals are institutionally incapable of satisfying the retributive
needs of the victims of war crimes, even if one of the lead criminals
falls into the tribunal's hands. The Yugoslav and Rwandan war
dra Stanley, Annan Urges Strong War Crimes Court, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June
16, 1998, at All.
3. See Matt Stearns, The Hague Likely to Land Nenw War Crimes Court, THE
NETHERLAN)DER, Dec. 20, 1997, at 5; see also Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposcd
Permanent International Criminal Court An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 665,
668 (1996); G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. GAOR. 51st Sess., U.N. Doe. A1511627 119b).
4. See Neuffer, supra note 2 (creating the Tribunal "culminates nearly 5O yeari
of lobbying by human rights advocates for a permanent court to carry on the ,legal
traditions first established by the Nuremburg tribunal for Nazi war criminals."); see
also William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death Pen-
alty, 60 ALB. L. RENv. 733, 742 (1997) (noting that the Genocide Convention envi-
sioned an international criminal court).
5. "Western governments have sought to blunt criticism about the failure to
capture the most prominent war criminals by claiming that they have little or no in-
formation about their whereabouts.... [Tihe inaction was really due to other
causes, including a need to conduct exhaustive preparations and a general reluctance
by top military commanders to undertake potentially risky operations." R. Jeffrey
Smith, French Qfficer's Visit with Karadzic Foiled Plan: Capture Delayed Bccause of
Fears He Was Tipped Off, SAN FRANCiSCo CHRON., Apr. 28, 1q98, at A12. Only one
high-level defendant was indicted by the Rwandan tribunal. See Chris McGreal, Re-
port Damns Rwanda Tribunak Mismanagement and U.N. Indifference Are Blamed
for Chaos at the Genocide Trials, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 13, 1997, at 14.
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crimes tribunals are largely a farce, and have even become mecha-
nisms for major international war criminals to escape capital punish-
ment.6
Penal systems do not exist merely to punish criminals. They are
also intended to prevent misbehavior, both by incapacitating wrong-
doers and deterring those who would otherwise follow their exam-
ple.7 The international legal order, to the extent that it exists, is no
exception. A truly effective Tribunal should not simply punish the
guilty; it should serve to prevent conflict and promote harmony. It is
here that the United Nations' current tribunal project fa [s far short.
This paper proposes a multitiered alternative to the Tribunal as
it is currently envisioned. In our proposed solution, the initial focus
will be national reconciliation, an attempt to maintain and regenerate
frayed social bonds. This will avoid the persistent charge of "victor's
justice" that permeates even the most successful war crimes prosecu-
tions. If indicted war criminals refuse to participate in the reconcilia-
tion effort, a swift system of international criminal justice should be
in place, in which individual States act as investigators and prosecu-
tors, and a neutral panel of international judges is empowered to
hand down sentences of restitution, imprisonment or death.
Though the authors hold few illusions that this proposal will be
adopted in the short term, we submit it as a workable model that
would repay closer scrutiny-especially after the U.N.'s Permanent
War Crimes Tribunal fades into irrelevance or collapses under its
own weight.
H. The Need for a Permanent War Crimes Court
A. The Nature of Modern International Conflict
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, heralding the end of the Cold
War, there prevailed a sense that the other, lesser conflicts around
the world would fade. But the "New World Order" has proved a
harsh one. The horrors of the battlefield remain and warfare in-
6. See William Drozdiak, Karadzic Reportedly Talking About Svrrendering, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 11, 1998, at A6; see also Levis Dolinsky, The Book on
Karadzic, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 29, 1998, at A10; Stephin Buckley, Ex-
Leader in Rwanda Admits to Genocide: Hutu Premier Pleads Before U.N. Tribunal,
WASH. POST, May 2, 1998, at A01.
7. See SANF ORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 113-14 (5th ed. 1989).
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creasingly targets non-combatant populations. Some fifteen percent
of the casualties in World War I were civilian. In World War II, ci-
vilian casualties numbered sixty-five percent. Casualties in wartime
today have risen to more than ninety percent civilian." Armed con-
flict increasingly takes on the character of terrorism writ large, rather
than of nation-versus-nation military encounters. The increasing in-
cidence of civilian massacres has prompted new calls for preventive
measures by prominent scholars' and statesmen alike."' But poorly
executed foreign adventures, like Somalia, have increased domestic
sensitivity to early interventions." After Mogadishu, the world re-
S. See The Impact of Armed Conkflict on Children. Patterns in Conflict: Civilians
Are Now the Target (visited June 14, 1998) <http:Ulvw axv.unicef.orgfgraca>.
9. One of the most recent and comprehensive cases for a "systematic, global
preventative regime" is MICHAEL LUND, PREVENTING VIOLENT CoNFLI1mTS: A
STRATEGY FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY (1996). Others include Stu.sv, L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR
3 (1995) ("The Yugoslavia crisis was not one but many conflicts. It evolved over
time, having a different character at subsequent stages and requiring different ac-
tions to prevent its continuation, particularly the descent into territorial war and eth-
nic violence-which was never inevitable.") and DAVID CLLAHAN, UN I" N;ABLE
WARS: ANmRIc.A POWER AND ETHNIC CONFLILTr 20 (1997) ("The ongoing dramas
in Burundi and Kosovo have provided textbook examples of \why preventive en-
gagement matters."). While Callahan in particular makes a formidable case for pre-
ventive diplomacy, his numerous case studies of missed opportunities, coupled with
the general unwillingness of the United States and the international community to
act more broadly, bolster our view that viable interventions must focus on post-%.ar
situations, the right side of Lund's conflict curve. See also ENFORCING RESTRAINT:
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed.,
1993).
10. Lund observes that in January 1992, the U.N. Security Council requested
"analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening 'the capacity of the United
Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and peacekeeping.'" LVD. sil-
pra note 9, at 4. President Bush stated before the U.N. General Assembly in 1992
that "monitoring and preventive peacekeeping 'may become especially crucial in
volatile regions,"' id. at 5, while former Secretary of State Warren Christopher ad-
dressed his confirmation panel by stating that "we cannot careen from crisis to crisis.
We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises... rather than
manage them." Id. "One of the lessons that has been repeatedly driven home is the
importance-and cost-effectiveness-of preventive diplomacy in dealing with con-
flict and complex emergencies. It is far more effective to ... strengthen the institu-
tions of conflict resolution than to heal ethnic and social divisions that have already
exploded into bloodshed." THE WNHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
FOR A NEW CENTURY 6-7 (1997): see also MOHLM.IED SAHOUN, SOMALIA: THE
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (1994) (Sahoun is the former U.N. Special Envoy to Soma-
lia.).
11. See generally JONATHAN STEVENSON, LOSING MOGADISHU (1995): Walter
Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,
FOREIGN AFt., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 70.
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fused to intervene in Rwanda until civil institutions there entirely
collapsed. So feeble was international response to the brutal Rwan-
dan civil war that, during his tour of Africa, President Clinton apolo-
gized for waiting so long to intervene." The same reluctance was dis-
played earlier in Yugoslavia, and is arguably being displayed again in
Kosovo. 3
Effective preventive measures are no doubt the most desirable
response to international strife. But the international community's
pattern of response to violent conflict over the past decade suggests
that international security institutions lack the stomach for early in-
tervention. Domestic politics ensure that no single nation will act un-
til the scale of destruction reaches catastrophic proportions. A sound
proposal to address the process of civil reconciliation and reconstruc-
tion postmortem, therefore, is both more realistic and more useful.
1. The Life History of Conflict
Michael S. Lund offers a taxonomy of the "life history of a con-
flict" (see Figure 1 below)." He suggests five "Stages, of Peace or
Conflict," organized into a bell curve.
12. See Robert I. Rotberg, Post-Clinton Africa: The Wait Begins, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 7, 1998, at 11 ("Clinton was right to apologize for his personal and
Washington's collective failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994.").
13. See 20 Ethnic Albanians Killed in Serbian Sweep for Separatists, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 6, 1998, at A13; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo Conflict
Swells to Ticking Time Bomb: Violence Increases Despite Frantic Search to Find
Resolution, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 28, 1998, at A17; The Siakes in Kosovo,
NAT'L REv., July 6, 1998, at 18 ("Serbia's Kosovo province was always understood to
be the most dangerous tinderbox of the former Yugoslavia, with the greatest poten-
tial for embroiling several neighboring states in a large-scale interrational war....
A serious plan to stop Milosevic at this late stage will mean a major NATO military
intervention, with a significant U.S. combat commitment, a diplomatic crisis with
Russia, and other costs. If we are not prepared for this, the time- to find out is
now.").
14. LUND, supra note 9, at 38-39.
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At the bottom rests the state of greatest peace and stability-a
"Durable Peace (Just Order)" signifying "a high level of reciprocity
and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defense measures
among parties.""5 In this stage, "peaceful institutionalized dispute
resolution prevails. 16 Directly above is "Stable Peace (Basic Or-
der)," characterized as "a relationship of wary communication and
limited cooperation (e.g., trade) within an overall context of basic or-
der or national stability., 17 Next, in the "Unstable Peace" stage,
"tension and suspicion among parties run high but violence is either
absent or sporadic" though "the parties perceive one another as
enemies."18 From an unstable peace evolves "Crisis," and from crisis,
"War. "19
According to Lund, most meaningful interventiors occur after
war has erupted. Lund refers to this period as "Peace Enforcement"
or "Conflict Mitigation." Credible military intervention by forces
overwhelmingly more powerful than the combatant parties (like
NATO's bombardment of Serb artillery positions in 1994 and the
subsequent occupation of Bosnia) has historically been the means to
still low-level conflicts. But massive intervention is no substitute for
stable institutions. Lund's focus is on preventive action, and he does
not offer a way to move from conflict termination to conflict resolu-
tion, or from resolution to reconciliation and "just order"
Lund's model suggests that conflict is not unique to armed com-
bat, but instead is prevalent in and between all societies. What dif-
ferentiates warring nations from peaceful ones is the existence of ro-
bust conflict resolution mechanisms.2  In a fully functioning
democracy like the United States (paradigmatic of Lund's "just or-
der"), peaceful resolution of ongoing conflict is deeply institutional-
ized in courts and governing mechanisms. This is ultimately reflected
in a culture of compromise in the face of irreconcilable differences:
Governance is conflict management. Governing a state is not only
the prevention of violent conflict from destroying the country; it is
the continual effort to handle the ordinary conflicts among groups






20. GOVERNANCEAS CONFLiCr MANAGEMENT 1 (I. William Zartman ed., 1997).
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duct of normal politics. As organized interests or groups bring their
demands to government, they necessarily conflict with others: ei-
ther the demands themselves meet opposition from competing
groups and demands, or, even if they do not, the measures required
to satisfy the demands conflict with competing resource allocations
or programmatic orientations. Managing these conflicts is the gov-
ernment's job. Resolution of these conflicts is often out of the
question, since they are normally ongoing, recurrent, and inherent.
But unmanaged, they threaten to escalate, leading to a variety of
debilitating outcomes: blockage of the governing process, a Wid-
ening split between state and society, outbreaks of violence, and
collapse of the state.21
As governing institutions mediate intrastate conflict, interna-
tional institutions (even those without legally binding mandates) me-
diate and provide constructive outlets for interstate conflict. For this
reason, strong and fair judicial structures are critical. In a nation
struggling to recover from civil war (Rwanda) or collaboration with
the enemy (France, Romania), a credible system of justice reduces
the need to take up arms while increasing the perceptions of just gov-
erance. Concentration on judicial institutions is made all the more
important because of the fragile and inherently unstable nature of
transitional democracies.n Internationally, a credible system of jus-
tice provides context for the world community to censure (and, in
principle, help prevent) war crimes.
2. The Case for a Neutral Court
When an international conflict ends, the impulse is to bring the
aggressor to trial immediately, without any attention paid to the soci-
21. Id.
22. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder observe that the period of instability
following a breakdown in stable institutions "lies in the nature of domestic political
competition after the breakup .... Both old and new elites use all the resources
they can muster to mobilize mass allies, often through nationalist appeals, to defend
their threatened positions and stake out new ones." Edward D. Mansfield & Jack
Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of War, in DEBATING THE DE-ii .'R,%T1W
PEACE 301, 303 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1996). Precisely this phenomenon oc-
curred in Rwanda and Bosnia. In both cases war resulted because of perceptions
that the democratic process would be binary ("you lose, I win%% in. you lose")
rather than cooperative, as proponents of democracy intended. Indeed, as institu-
tions increased in strength and settlements neared, parties sought to maximize their
advances through violent means, fearing that after a settlement no more could be
gained. See id. Without credible mechanisms of power sharing backed by significant
efforts at reconciliation, the international community should expect attempts to in-
troduce democratic institutions to only bring further violence.
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ety he harmed. Calls for Saddam Hussein's indictment and trial be-
gan well before the Gulf War was over." This impulse is counterpro-
ductive. First, pursuing leaders of competing factions may marginal-
ize the only actors capable of bringing conflict to a close. The result
is a substantial expenditure of political capital and a significant nar-
rowing of political options. The United Nations' ill-fated attempt to
capture General Aideed only elevated him to folk-hero status among
the Somalis,2 4 and the criminalization of key figures in Yugoslavia
and elsewhere arguably reduces the likelihood that they will partici-
pate in future mediated efforts. The undermining of the mediation
process furthers the perception that fair and just power sharing will
not occur after a settlement is reached. Leaders face q simple cost-
benefit analysis: re-engage in violent struggle and perhaps emerge
the victor, or negotiate for peace and face certain criminal prosecu-
tion. For a Milosevic or an Aideed, the choice is a simple one.
Something must be done. The alternative is a never-ending cycle
of private retribution-a "warre ... of every man against every
man" 26 and, ultimately, every State against every State. There must
be some mechanism, other than subjugation by overwhelming mili-
tary force, to see that armed conflicts, once over, remain over. This
mechanism is unlikely to arise naturally at the national level- there-
fore it must be pursued at the international level. All States have a
strong incentive to see that basic universal standards of conduct are
maintained, even in an international system that is essentially anar-
chic. Some sort of prospective and retrospective evaluation of the
norms to which all States will be held is needed to educate and deter.
In short, there should be some sort of international war crimes court.
This judgment informed the empanelling of war crimes tribunals in
Nuremburg, Tokyo, the Hague (for Yugoslavia) and Arusha (for
Rwanda). We submit that the basic judgment all four tribunals rep-
resent-that an international court is a necessary body in modern in-
ternational relations-is sound.
23. See H.R. Con. Res. 66, 102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC. H684 (1991): S. Con.
Res. 7, 102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC. S1286-87 (1991); S. Res. 15. 102d Cong., 137
CONG. REC. S1007 (1991).
24. STEVENSON, supra note 11, at 85 ("Once [U.N. special envoy] Howe put a
price on Aidid's head, after Aidid's men had killed twenty-four Pakistani peace-
keepers, Aidid became a genuine folk hero.").
25. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Senate Wants Saddam Tried for War Crimes, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., March 14, 1998, at A07.
26. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185 (Penguin ed. 1968) (1651).
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B. Alternatives to a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal
But such a court is not without its detractors. The most persua-
sive objection to a permanent international war crimes court is that,
as any bureaucracy, it will inevitably try to generate its own caseload.
"[O]nce such a Court is established it is more than likely to expand
its own jurisdiction at the expense of State sovereignty."' Though
Jamison argues that "the international community would benefit
greatly from a large number of cases being brought early on in its
tenure,"' the reality is that an avalanche of war crimes charges in the
first few years of the court's existence will put far too much political
pressure on the fledgling institution. In addition, it would undermine
any court's legitimacy and mandate to seek out and punish true war
criminals.
Also, following World War I, some commentators argued that a
war crimes court:
would render a peace impossible. When the soldiers and sailors
had finished fighting, when hostilities were over and the soldiers
and sailors on both sides were ready to shake hands with one an-
other,... the lawyers would begin a war of accusation and counter
accusation and recrimination. Such a war would render a peace of
reconciliation impossible.=
It may be the case, then, that war crimes prosecutions will increase
schisms.' Having become aware of the problems a permanent inter-
national war crimes court may face, the question is whether there is a
better alternative.
1. Courts Martial
National courts, not international bodies, historically punished
people convicted of war crimes." In fact, soldiers on foreign soil are
by definition criminals under domestic law. In November and De-
cember 1943, the Soviets charged and convicted Nazis in national
27. See Wexer, supra note 3, at 714.
28. Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal
That Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENv. J. INT'L L. & PoI'Y 419, 446 (1 195).
29. Wexler, supra note 3, at 672 (quoting Sir Graham Bower's remarks at the
1926 meeting of the International Law Association).
30. Id.
31. Israel. for example, prosecuted Nazi Adolph Eichmann, and the United
States charged Lt. William Calley. Steven J. Lepper. War Crimes and the Protection
of Peacekeeping Forces, 28 AKRON L. REv. 411, 412 (1995); see Calley v. Callavay.
519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
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courts.32 Nations like Germany and Israel continue to hunt Nazi war
criminals.33 Furthermore, U.S. courts have always been active in ap-
plying U.S. law to war crimes:
[T]he United States has imposed sanctions on violators of the laws
of armed conflict, both customary and treaty-based, since the dawn
of the United States, and in every war in which the United States
has participated. In each war, for more than 200 years, we have
prosecuted our own nationals for such criminal activity, although
foreign enemies were also prosecuted, in some cases in greater
numbers. Some of the World War I and II trials of U.S. nationals
are still classified, although one wonders why, and it is not true that
international criminal prosecution started at Nuremburg or that
such effort by the United States has only occurred against enemy
nationals defeated on the battlefield:34
Everett, Silliman and Martins suggest using domestic military courts
as a regular forum for the prosecution of war criminals.'5 Some con-
tend that successor regimes have a duty to prosecute human rights
abuses perpetrated under previous regimes." Certainly, this would
streamline the problem of developing legal norms." It would also
provide nations like the United States much more freedom to pursue
war criminals.
Martins believes that "national courts remain, at least for now, a
32. See Laurie A. Cohen, Comment, Application of the Realist and Liberal Per-
spectives to the Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremburg and
Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 113, 132 (1997).
33. See, e.g., William Drozdiak, War Crimes Suspect Arrested in Germany. SAN
FRANcIsco CHRON., Mar. 5, 1998, at A14 (discussing the apprehension in Stuttgart
of Alfons Goestzfried, a former Gestapo agent said to have personally shot five hun-
dred people at the Majdanek concentration camp in Poland; Goestzfried had been
imprisoned after the war by the Soviets but was released in 1958.).
34. Duane W. Layton, Reporter, Forty Years After the Nuremburg and Tokyo
Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on International and National Law,
80 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 56, 57 (1986) (remarks by Jordan J. Paut).
35. See Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing Offenses
Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 509 (1994); see also Mark S.
Martins, Comment, National Forums for Punishing Offenses Against International
Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have Their Day in the Same Court?, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 659
(1996).
36. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
37. See Everett & Silliman, supra note 35, at 516 (noting that a general court-
martial would employ the Military Rules of Evidence, which are essentially the same
as the Federal Rules of Evidence, but that Congress could also enact different legal
rules).
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more feasible option in many contexts than international courts....
[Flar more war crimes have been tried by national than by interna-
tional courts."" It is a little-known fact that U.S. military officers
tried thousands of defendants for international crimes before military
tribunals, including "Medcan robbers in the 1848 war, Confederate
officers in the Civil War and Filipino guerrillas in the 'pacification'
campaign of 1898.'" In other nations, national war crimes tribunals
also substantially outnumber international trials. At the end of
World War I, "the Allies deferred to Germany for the prosecution of
a limited number of German violators.4 1
Qualified military tribunals are surely superior to domestic civil
courts, which are inadequate to the task of enforcing the laws of war
for technical and evidentiary reasons." In addition, it is arguably the
positive duty of States to enact laws implementing the Geneva Con-
ventions. If so, military codes of justice that incorporate Geneva
Convention norms can be seen as quasi-international.
But military tribunals may lack sufficient gravitas to satisfy the
victims of war crimes or the international community and suffer from
the appearance (even if unjustified) of partiality. Thus, at least part
of the rationale for an international criminal court is "the need for a
trial court that can prosecute and suppress the most serious crimes of
international concern in cases in which national trials would not oc-
cur" or would be ineffective."
2. War Crime Charges as "Bargaining Chips"
American and British authorities kept their war crimes policy se-
cret until World War H concluded.s Apparently, they were con-
38. Martins, supra note 35, at 668-69.
39. Id at 669 n.49.
40. Id.
41. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 A,,. J. I%,fYL L. 784, 786
(1994).
42. See generally David S. Bloch, Dangers of Righteousness: Unintended Conse-
quences of Kadic v. Karadzic, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35 (1996); see also Daid
D. Minier, Dirge Without Music, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 12, 1998, at 6 (deycribing. with
some regret, successful efforts to exclude evidence of genocide by the Ottoman Em-
pire in the murder trial of Gourgen Mkrtich Yanikian, thus "-destroy[ing] the hopes
for an Armenian Nuremburg.").
43. See Everett & Silliman, supra note 35, at 511.
44. See Wexler, supra note 3, at 710.
45. See Cohen, supra note 32, at 123.
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cerned that identifying war criminals would reduce incentives to sur-
render and possibly provide an excuse for the "wholesale slaughter of
Anglo-American prisoners of war."46 This was a legitimate concern,
and it is one that has seemingly escaped those who convened the
Rwandan and Yugoslavian ad hoc tribunals. Of course, the uncer-
tainty of an effective war crimes prosecution has a cost of its own, by
diluting the deterrent effect of enforceable international war crimes
conventions. Accordingly, D'Amato suggests that war crimes
charges be used explicitly as bargaining chips in attempts to settle
conflicts like Yugoslavia:
[T]he United Nations would tell the warring parties to the Bosnian
conflict that the international war crimes tribunal will proceed un-
less the Muslims, Croats and Serbs agree inter se in their peace ne-
gotiations to ask the United Nations to dissolve the tribunal - a re-
quest that the Security Council will grant. By thus delegating the
decision on war crimes prosecution to the antagonists themselves,
the United Nations would have put the tribunal in play as an ex-
plicit bargaining chip in the peace negotiations.
This notion has many virtues, chief among them being that it
"transforms a war crime into a cost of war.... By internalizing the
costs of the commission of war crimes, international law will be able
to bring to a successful conclusion the theory that war crimes are not
required by, and indeed are counterproductive to, military neces-
sity."' It also recognizes that most of today's armed conflicts do not
result in total defeat or unconditional surrender of adversaries. It
was these conditions that permitted the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials
to be held after World War 11.49 In many modem conflicts, States end
up dealing with (even aiding) their former opponents. For instance,
the United States is backing World Bank water projects that are di-
recting hundreds of thousands of dollars into the hands, of Radovan
Karadzic's allies.50
46. Id.; see BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 9 (19F.1).
47. Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
500,503 (1994).
48. Id. at 505-06.
49. Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the
1990's, 10 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 223,242 (1992).
50. See Lewis Dolinsky, Notes from Here and There: U.S. Gives the Devil His
Due, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., Jan. 14, 1998, at C02 ("The U.S. government is back-
ing World Bank water projects in areas of the Bosnian Serb Republic that are con-
trolled by allies of former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, who is No. 1
on The Hague war-crimes tribunal's most-wanted list. Some towns being aided are
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But D'Amato's argument relies too strongly on the rational self-
interest of hostile combatants, who cannot be expected, in all circum-
stances, to calculate the potential ramifications of a contemplated
war crime. In addition, world public opinion may not tolerate the
idea that war criminals can bargain their way out of prosecution."
Further, such a rule would allow self-interested leaders to essentially
agree to a "group pardon," thereby reducing the deterrent effect of
war crimes prosecutions. Indeed, D'Amato notes that prosecution by
the tribunal is only a valuable bargaining chip if the peace negotiators
"have a realistic fear of being prosecuted." 2 Finally, this model re-
quires that the U.N. Security Council be the sole charging author-
ity-a result that is not compelled by existing lax and may not be de-
sirable.'
3. Ad Hoc Tribunals
One advantage of the ad hoc procedure is that it permits States
and the United Nations "a certain flexibility in addressing particular
crises." " An ad hoc war crimes tribunal can be created by the Secu-
rity Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, by multilateral
treaty or potentially by the U.N. General Assembly.' Four such tri-
bunals have been created: the 1919 Commission on the Responsibili-
ties of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties for
Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, which unsuccessfully
sought to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, Emperor of
Germany; the 1943 U.N. War Crimes Commission, convened in
Nuremburg and Tokyo; the 1992 Commission of Experts to investi-
gate war crimes in Yugoslavia;" and the Tanzania-based 1994 Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda.' The United States now
known to harbor Serbs accused of var crimes, or are, in part, being run by them.").
51. D'Amato, supra note 47, at 500.
52. Id. at 505.
53. But see Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Derclopment of
International Law, 88 AMNf. J. LNT. L. 78, 79 (1994) (The Security Council is the ex-
clusive charging authority for international var crimes.).
54. See Wexier, supra note 3. at 712.
55. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and Triq-
gering Mechanisms, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 2.3 (1997).
56. See Bassiouni, supra note 41, at 784. Professor Bassiouni, writing before the
establishment of the Rwanda tribunal, indicated that only three such commissions
had been established in modem history.
57. See Joshua Hammer & Marcus Mabry, Victim or Mass Murderer?,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9,1998, at 56.
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advocates the creation of another ad hoc war crimes tribunal to
prosecute Cambodia's Khmer Rouge."'
Nonetheless, ad hoc tribunals suffer from serious defects. First,
they require chartering statutes, which will change with prevailing
political winds and undermine the precedential value of court deci-
sions.59 Second, ad hoc courts will continue to run into ex post facto
objections unless they adopt identical descriptions of crmes, because
otherwise potential defendants will not know the exact crimes that
can be charged." Third, "the time, expense, and difficulty of estab-
lishing an ad hoc tribunal renders it an ineffective mechanism of de-
terring crime."'" Fourth, such tribunals "give the impression of arbi-
trary and selective prosecution, no matter how 'fair' the actual trial
proceedings are."'62 A review of past ad hoc tribunals reveals their
virtues and, ultimately, their insurmountable flaws.63
a. Tokyo and Nuremburg
Though they continue to be dogged with charges of "victor's jus-
tice," it is difficult to dispute the success of the Nuremburg and To-
kyo war crimes tribunals.' In Tokyo, all twenty-eight defendants
were convicted; seven men were sentenced to death by hanging, and a
few received light sentences. Most defendants received life impris-
onment.6 In Nuremburg, three defendants were fully acquitted, sev-
eral others received partial acquittals and prison sentences, and ten
58. U.S. Wants U.N. Tribunal to Go After Khmer Rouge: Leaders Could Face
Genocide Charges, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., Apr. 30, 1998, at All.
59. Id. ("Both defendants and commentators have raised the isste of the [Rwan-
dan and Yugoslav] tribunals' legitimacy, pointing out that their creation depended
on action by the Security Council, an inherently political organ."). Such a situation
begs the question, does the fact that the Yugoslav tribunal cannot sentence convicted
war criminals to death mean that their crimes were less serious than those committed
by the Nazis or Japanese during World War II?
60. Cohen, supra note 32, at 121; Jamison, supra note 28, at 437.
61. Jamison, supra note 28, at 420; see also Wexler, supra note 3, at 712 ("Ad hoc
tribunals represent a post hoc mechanism that takes time to establi:,h-time during
which evidence may be destroyed and additional lives lost.").
62. Wexler, supra note 3, at 712.
63. Scharf draws similar conclusions in his argument for a free,;tanding perma-
nent truth commission. Michael Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International
Truth Commission, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375 (1997).
64. The Tokyo tribunal, however, was apparently riddled with procedural and
evidentiary errors, and has been almost universally condemned on those grounds.
See Layton, supra note 34, at 64 (remarks by M. Cherif Bassiouni) ("That is why
Nuremburg is the point of historical and legal reference and not Tokyo.").
65. Id. at 426.
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criminals were hanged.* '
It should be noted that some 185 other Nazis were tried after
Nuremburg under Control Council Law 10.' It was in these later
prosecutions of doctors, judges, nongovernmental officials and indus-
trialists that the issues of individual responsibility and the complexi-
ties of affirmative defenses like duress were addressed in detail."
b. Yugoslavia and Rwanda
The Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals, by contrast, have not
accomplished any significant prosecutions, nor are they likely to in
the near future. About eighty war criminals have been indicted for
actions taken in the Yugoslavian civil war, but a few have been
prosecuted.6' In the first verdict, soldier Drazen Erdemovic was sen-
tenced to ten years imprisonment after pleading guilty to following
military orders directing him to kill hundreds of Bosnian civilians."
About twenty others,' mostly low-ranking soldiers,' have been cap-
tured and charged. Some are Muslim or Croatian, but the majority
are Bosnian Serbs.7' These include Dusan (or Dusko) Tadic, a Bos-
nian Serb accused of killing sixteen civilians, ' and Goran Jelisic, a 29-
66. Jamison, supra note 28, at 425.
67. Layton, supra note 34, at 57 (remarks by Jordan J. Paust).
68. Id. at 58 (remarks by Telford Taylor).
69. Cohen, supra note 32, at 148-49.
70. Id.; see Charles Truehart, Bosnia War Crimes Panel Imposes First Sentence,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 30, 1996, at A01. The result highlights the quandary faced by Sol-
diers during wartime: "the position of a soldier is in theory and may be in practice a
difficult one. He may, as it has been well said, be liable to be shot by a Court-martial
if he disobeys an order, and to be hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it." AAN.
DIcEY, INTRODUCT'ION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITLTzI'IO 194 (Sth
ed. 1914).
71. Serb 'Hitler' Arrested by U.S. Troops, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 23, 1998,
at C02.
72. Mary Williams Walsh, Anti-Serb Atrocities Described in Court, SAN,.
FRANCiSCO CHRON., Mar. 11, 1997, at B01 (discussing charges against three Bosnian
Muslims and a Bosnian Croat involved in a southern Bosnian prison camp; "[ciritics
of the tribunal... have complained that it is wasting firepower on the petty criminals
of the war while the main quarries-Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his
military leader Ratko Mladic-remain at large.").
73. Id. (discussing the trials of Bosnian Muslims Zejnil Delalic, Dravko Mucic,
Hazim Delic and Bosnian Croat Esad Landzo; all were prison administrators or
guards.).
74. Cohen, supra note 32, at 149. Tadic was charged w ith crimes against human-
ity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war crimes. WVetder, supra note
3, at 721. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic
Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2031 (1998).
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year-old Bosnian Serb prison camp guard charged with seventy-seven
offenses, including genocide and crimes against humanily.
75
But the principal accused offenders-Radovan Karadzic, former
president of the self-proclaimed Republika Srbska, and General
Ratko Mladic, Karadzic's chief military commander-remain at large
and conduct themselves with impunity in Serbian Bosnia.7 " Dario
Kordic, the most important Bosnian Croat indicted by the tribunal,
"travels freely in western Bosnia and Croatia." 7 Slobodan Milosevic
continues to rule Serbia and Montenegro while under investigation
by the Yugoslav tribunal for complicity in war crimes."' The Rwan-
dan tribunal was unable to convince a federal judge in Texas to ex-
tradite accused war criminal Elizaphan Ntakitutimana.79
Worse, the subject nations-Yugoslavia and Rwanda-are ac-
tively hostile to an enterprise that is ostensibly intended to achieve
justice for wrongs perpetrated against their citizenry. We are thus
faced with a bizarre paradox. The accused war criminals turn them-
selves in to the international authorities just as their opponents close
in and their power base crumbles. They are guaranteed much better
treatment in antiseptic Western jails than in the hands of their vic-
tims' countrymen. Thus, Karadzic floats the possibility of surrender",
just as his rivals consolidate their power in the Republika Srbska.
(The tribunal was invited to open an office in Bosnia's Banja Luka,
where the new Bosnian Serb premier-a Karadzic opponent-prom-
ised efforts ensure that the indicted "turn themselves in.").xl
75. Serb 'Hitler' Arrested by U.S. Troops, supra note 71, at C02 (Jelisic, indicted
in July 1995, "referred to himself as 'Adolf' in reference to Adolf Hitler"); War
Crimes Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 27, 1998, at All.
76. Colin Soloway & Stephen J. Hedges, How Not to Catch a War Criminal, U.S.
NEws & WORLD RnP., Dec. 9, 1996, at 63; Colin Soloway et al., The Serbian Spoiler,
U.S. N~ws & WORLD REP., May 20, 1996, at 35.
77. Tim Zimmermann et al., Three Cheers for Disorder, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 16, 1996, at 47.
78. Blakesley, supra note 55, at 233 n.6.
79. Reverend Ntakitutimana, 73, fled Rwanda in 1994 and now lives with his son
in Laredo, Texas. "He vigorously denies accusations that as pastor tie gathered Tut-
sis in the Seventh-Day Adventist church compound [in Mugonero, Rwanda], then
commandeered a convoy of militiamen and soldiers to murder them." Hammer &
Mabry, supra note 57, at 56. His son Gerald, a physician accused of participating in
the massacre, was arrested in the Ivory Coast and extradited to Tanzania; he faces
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. Id. at 57.
80. He has even circulated a draft defense to the charges against him. See Dolin-
sky, supra note 6, at A10.
81. Serb Town Invites War Crimes Panel, SAN FRANCISCO CHROIN., Feb. 10, 1998,
at A12.
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Meanwhile, the Yugoslav tribunal is reducing sentences in the
hopes that it will encourage those accused of war crimes to surrender
for trial.' It is also letting some war criminals free so the tribunal can
"concentrate on prosecuting more senior suspects."' The Justice
Minister of Yugoslavia already announced that, rather than turning
over war criminals to U.N. tribunal, Yugoslavia will try them in do-
mestic courts.' This is directly contrary to the Yugoslav tribunal
statute, under which the tribunal has "primacy" and may "formally
request" that a national court cease prosecution in favor of the tribu-
nal's assertion of jurisdiction at any stage5
The situation in Rwanda is even starker. According to U.N. In-
spector General Karl Paschke, "[niot a single administrative area [of
the Court] functioned effectively."'' Former Rwandan Prime Minis-
ter Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to genocide at the international
tribunal to avoid a death sentence in his homeland. Rwandan
authorities, however, have turned their backs on the international
war crimes court. Instead, they try the perpetrators of genocide in
hearings that last hours and result, commonly, in death sentences.-
Of the 130,000 Rwandans indicted for genocide, 100,000 remain in
jail awaiting trial. 9 This is a nearly impossible task for a Third World
nation trying to rebuild after an attempted internecine genocide.
The central problem with the Yugoslav and Rwandan War
82. Croat's Term Halved in Massacre Case, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 6,
1998, at A13.
83. U.N. Charges Against Bosnian Serbs Dropped, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May
9,1998, at A12.
84. Politics This Week, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 14, 1998, at 4 ("Yugoslavia's justice
minister said citizens indicted for war crimes would not be sent for trial by the var-
crimes tribunal in The Hague. Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) would try sus-
pects itself.") (emphasis omitted).
85. James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. I,"t'L L. 639, 655 (1993) (dis-
cussing Article 9 of the Yugoslav Tribunal's constitutive statute).
86. McGreal, supra note 5, at 14.
87. Buckley, supra note 6, at A01 ("Tribunal officials suggested that Kambanda's
guilty plea was not connected to the 22 public executions carried out by the Rwan-
dan government last Friday after its own separate proceedings. But under the tribu-
nal's rules, he cannot be tried in Rwandan courts for the same crimes.").
88. "Rwandan judges... sometimes take as little as a day to dispose of matters
before them.... At least 330 people have been put on trial on various charges re-
lating to the genocide in Rwanda; 116 have been sentenced to die." Ann M. Sim-
mons. Rwanda to Hold Public Executions over 1994 Genocide, SAN FPINCIscO
CI-RON., Apr. 23, 1998, at A13.
89. Id
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Crimes Tribunals is that "[n]o clear victors exist to Iorce the van-
quished parties to relinquish the accused."' As a consequence, com-
pliance is a serious problem. Jurisdictional problems also plague the
tribunals:
The Hague Regulations, the Nuremburg judgment and Additional
Protocol I apply to international armed conflicts. The conflict in
the former Yugoslavia has internal and international elements.
There was only one country until Slovenia declared independence
on June 25, 1991. Thereafter, some fighting involved intranational
conflict (particularly Bosnian against Bosnian) and some interna-
tional elements, such as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA); the
JNA was officially withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
spring of 1992, ostensibly leaving only internal combatants there. It
is possible ... that the tribunal might determine the conflict to be
internal; noting that it was not to make new law, it could refuse to
apply the law of international armed conflict to some or all the
fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina after the spring of 1992, when some
of the worst war crimes appear to have taken place.91
O'Brien contends that this interpretation of the statute would be
incorrect because the combatants fought under the banners of (that
is, as proxies for) different State and quasi-State interests within
Yugoslavia. As it turns out, the tribunal did, in fact, assert jurisdic-
tion. But the fact that the combatants declared independence does
not, without more, turn a civil war into an international conflict. The
fact that the warring factions agreed to the Geneva Conventions does
not mean they are bound by them;' this is not an arbitration or con-
tract, in which participants are held to the rules they choose.
C. The Virtues of a Permanent International War Crimes Tribunal
The establishment of a permanent tribunal with an explicit man-
90. Cohen, supra note 32, at 154; accord James S. Robbins, Iraqi War Criminals
Face Hanging, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 24, 1991, at 8 ("The U.S. has not conducted
war crimes trials since those following the Second World War-not for lack of war
criminals, but because the unsuccessful conclusion of the Korean ard Vietnam wars
did not permit the U.S. to bring the offenders to trial.").
91. O'Brien, supra note 85, at 647.
92. In the context of the Yugoslavian civil war, one of the authors has observed:
"while the Bosnian Serb 'government' has declared its allegiance to the Geneva
Conventions, its lack of recognized sovereign capacity undercuts its ability to make
such claims.... [T]hat the Geneva Conventions (or aspects of them) are customary
international law still begs the question of whether international law of this sort acts
on non-sovereign entities." Bloch, supra note 42, at 41.
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date and clearly-identified charging offenses avoids the most persua-
sive challenge to prior and existing ad hoc war crimes courts; namely,
that they apply new laws ex post facto."" "If a war crimes court, the
procedures it follows, and the laws it applies all predate the allegedly
criminal conduct, then the outcome of its trials wvill be less open to
doubt."' The deterrent value is also enhanced by a consistent court
with a clear mandate:
Exercises of power perceived to be arbitrary cannot deter because
by their very arbitrariness they obscure what is being deterred: are
you cautioning me never again to kill prisoners or never again to
lose the war? Forums for punishing offenses against the law of na-
tions must exhibit awareness of this basic truth.'
By the same token, a consistent court with precedential rulings would
have an educational and preventive effect.?
The permanent court's neutrality will increase compliance and
reassure participants. The fact that "both the victorious and the de-
feated parties in Bosnia [are to be charged] before an 'impartial' tri-
bunal... may quell some fears that the Bosnian tribunal will be un-
just."' That the tribunal is ad hoc has undermined its authority; it is
viewed by Serbs as an instrument of oppression.'
93. Cohen, supra note 32, at 121, 139 ("Perhaps most significantly, the creators of
the legal system for the international tribunal at Nuremburg faced the difficulty of
retroactive application of new law."); Jamison, supra note 28, at 437 (-It is difficult
for an ad hoc court to place individuals on notice of its laws if it is not in existence.");
Edward M. Wise, General Rules of Criminal Law, 25 DENv. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 313,
313 (1997) ("Almost everywhere... the principle of legality has been taken to re-
quire that crimes be specifically proscribed by law in advance of the conduct sought
to be punished."). Some treaties elevate this principle to that status of a basic human
right. See, e-g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217AIIII), U.N.
GAOR, at art. 11(2), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("No one shall be held guilty of any
penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal of-
fence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed."); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966) ("No one shall be held guilty of
any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it %,as com-
mitted.").
94. Martins, supra note 35, at 675.
95. Id. at 685-86 (footnote omitted).
96. O'Brien, supra note 85, at 640; see also Scharf, supra note 63.
97. Jamison, supra note 28, at 426.
98. Dusan Cotic, A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRmz. L.F. 223, 231-32 (1995) ("In Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) ... the discussions surrounding the creation of [the Tribunal] were focused al-
most entirely on crimes allegedly committed by Serbs (the Federal Army, Serbs from
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A permanent war crimes court is the best alternative available
for mediating international conflict. Modem examples of war crimes
courts have failed to accomplish the two basic goals of a court system:
(1) preserving and strengthening social institutions by channeling
conflict, and (2) providing satisfactory justice for the victims. Below,
we propose an alternative paradigm that satisfies these two impera-
tives.
HI. A New Paradigm for the Permanent War Crimes Court
A Permanent War Crimes Tribunal thus has two competing
mandates. It must provide justice for victims, and it must offer an
opportunity to regenerate societies ravaged by warfare. When these
mandates conflict, the international community must prefer societal
regeneration over individual satisfaction. Thus, we propose a court
whose first step is to induce voluntary self-revelation by war crimi-
nals-and then, if they refuse, to try them to the fullest extent of the
law. We propose a two-tiered Tribunal with limited jurisdiction and
individual States acting as prosecutors. The Tribunal will have the
following features, each of which is discussed at length below:
- Jurisdiction will be limited to a well-defined set of "core" war
crimes, like genocide, conspiracy and crimes against humanity. The
Tribunal's constitutional mandate will not permit easy e.xpansion, and
it should not be allowed to metastasize into an international criminal
court of general jurisdiction.
* The Tribunal will consist of four panels: an Indictment Panel,
a Truth and Reconciliation Panel, a Trial Panel and an Appeals
Panel. Each will be staffed by internationally recognized jurisconsuls,
judges, attorneys and statesmen.
* The Tribunal will serve in a purely judicial capacity. It will of-
fer a forum for the war crimes trials but will not actively undertake
their prosecution. Unlike the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals,
there will be no international prosecutorial corps. Instead, any State
can serve as prosecutor before the neutral Tribunal. But State discre-
tion will not be unfettered: an independent panel, the Indictment
Panel, will certify charges for hearing after an investigation of the
evidence proffered by the charging State.
9 An indicted war criminal will be encouraged to plead guilty
Krajina and the Bosnian Serb Republic, and Serbian volunteers) and their leader-
ship. This presumption and the bias in media coverage ... undoubtedly rallied Ser-
bian public opinion against the proposed court and other international initiatives.").
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and present himself before the Truth and Reconciliation Panel. Full
cooperation with the Truth and Reconciliation Panel will substan-
tially limit further prosecution for the crimes charged. Bringing indi-
viduals to justice must sometimes be sacrificed for the sake of re-
building credible institutions.
e Accused war criminals who refuse to participate in the truth
and reconciliation process will be tried before the Trial Panel. Con-
victs may be sentenced to death.
* An Appeals Panel, wholly separated from the work of the In-
dictment, Truth and Reconciliation, and Trial Panels, will hear chal-
lenges to decisions by the other panels, including the decision to as-
sert jurisdiction.
A. Jurisdictional Limits
Some argue that the institution of a Permanent War Crimes Tri-
bunal is or should be the first step toward the creation of an interna-
tional criminal court." They are wrong. An international criminal
99. See, e.g., MacPherson's proposal for an international criminal court, which
starts with jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against peace, but is intended to
eventually expand to enforce a complete code of international criminal law. BRYAN
F. MACPHERSON, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: APPLYING VORLD LXW TO
INDIVIDUALS: CENTER FOR U.N. REFORM EDUCATION MONOGRAPH 10 (1992); sce
also Meron, supra note 53 ("Whatever the practical achievements of the interna-
tional tribunal for Yugoslavia may prove to be, the United Nations Security Council
has established the first truly international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.");
Ralph Zacklin, Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 277, 281 (1994) (-The [Yugo-
slav] Tribunal will be, at the very least, an exercise in establishing mechanisms to
judge war crimes, and at most an effective model that may be utilized in the estab-
lishment of a permanent tribunal with a broader criminal jurisdiction."). Others, in-
terestingly, argue precisely the opposite: "Inclusion of war crimes, crimes against
peace, and other crimes with political overtones should, for the time being, not be
under an [International Criminal Court's] jurisdiction.... The ICC should have ju-
risdiction solely over individuals, and with the approval of both the nation of which
the defendant is a national and the nation where the alleged crime occurred." Ca% ic-
chia, supra note 49, at 258-59.
For a good discussion of the history of international penal law-as distinguished
from the narrower category of the law of war-along with a model statute for an in-
ternational criminal court that overcomes many, though not all, objections, see Jami-
son, supra note 28. See also Cavicchia, supra note 45. Jamison's main problem is
that she asserts, without adequate justification, that all individuals are subject to in-
ternational law. She writes, "The world continued slowly' but steadily, tow ard a so-
ciety in which its members would be responsible for their criminal actions." Jamison,
supra note 28, at 428. This would be accurate if the "members" in question were
States. But Jamison is also willing to apply international standards of conduct to ter-
rorists and insurgents. Rebel factions are by definition not members of international
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court is an unworkable entity whose existence would, if anything, un-
dermine the international rule of law. Obstacles like extradition
rules, codification of an internationally acceptable criminal code and
the Act of State doctrine"'° are difficult to overcome, and the barrier
of State sovereignty is insurmountable."0 ' This is because the concept
of "international crime" is far too nebulous. According to some, in-
ternational crimes include aggression, war crimes, unlawful use of
weapons, crimes against humanity, genocide, racial discrimination
and apartheid, slavery and slave trade, torture, unlawful human ex-
perimentation, piracy, aircraft hijacking, threat or use of force against
internationally protected persons, taking civilian hostages, drug of-
fenses, international traffic in obscene publications, destruction or
theft of national treasures, environmental pollution, theft of nuclear
materials, unlawful use of mails, interference with submarine cables,
falsification and counterfeiting, and bribery of foreign public offi-
cials.'" An international criminal court with jurisdiction over all
these crimes "codified in the international community through both
custom and convention"' is infeasible and overly ambitious. Moreo-
ver, the International Court of Justice already exists to mediate dis-
putes in many of these areas.
So a Permanent International Criminal Court is probably impos-
sible. A Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, by contrast, is both feasi-
ble and desirable. The international community as a whole would
benefit from this concrete reminder that war, too, is governed by ba-
society; indeed, their entire project is to force their way into the community of na-
tions by strength of arms. To argue that Kurdish or Palestinian rebels are "members
of international society" merely because they want membership enough to raise an
army is an error. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 42, at 42 ("The capacity to engage in
formal relations cannot be defined solely on the basis of an ability to raise troops and
a willingness to engage in enough violence to spur peace negotiatiors."), Jamison is
wrong in other matters as well. Despite what she writes in the introduction to her
article, the inscription on the gate of the Dachau concentration camp is not George
Santayana's "Those who forget [sic: "cannot remember"] the past are condemned to
repeat it." 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905). It is Arbeit
Macht Frei: "work makes one free" or "work will set you free." GUIDE, MEMORIAL
SITE CONCENTRATION CAMP DACHAU 3 (1993).
100. Jamison, supra note 28, at 419.
101. "The principle of sovereignty and states' assertion of exclusive competence
over criminal matters still dominate the international scene." Cotic, ,'upra note 98, at
225.
102. Jamison, supra note 28, at 433. For an enumeration of the various treaties
from which these "international crimes" can be identified, see Cavicchia, supra note
49, at 240 n.130.
103. Jamison, supra note 28, at 433.
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sic standards of conduct:
[A]n international interest exists that is above and beyond the in-
terests of the parties. The international interest consists of deter-
ring would-be war criminals. This interest may be quite irrelevant
to the victims of the atrocities in Bosnia, but it is fonvard-looking in
its attempt to deter similar atrocities in future conflicts.
Thus, the Tribunal's jurisdiction should be limited to those crimes
that have been recognized historically and by treaty as the subject of
international jurisdiction: war crimes, 5 crimes against humanity,'
genocide, 7 crimes against peacel' and conspiracy."'
104. D'Amato, supra note 47, at 503; see also Wexler, supra note 3. at 665-lb
("Legal accountability, if consistently enforced, would surely bring about much of
the good on an international scale that it does domestically, in terms of deterrence of
crime, rehabilitation of the victims of crime, retribution for the criminal act, and up-
holding the principles of justice and law.").
105. War crimes consist of "violations of the laws or customs of war. They are
traditionally defined by the Geneva and Hague conventions. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devas-
tation not justified by military necessity." NUREMBURG CHARTER art. 61b). See
Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Y wgoslari,.
The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENy. J. IN%'iL L. & PoL'Y
235,260 (1994). Under the statute of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, -'%iolations
of the laws or customs of war" include (a) use of chemical weapons or weapons cal-
culated to cause "unnecessary" suffering, (b) wanton destruction of cities, tovn' or
villages, not justified by military necessity, (c) attack of or bombardment upon unde-
fended areas, (d) seizure or destruction "or willful damage done to institutions dedi-
cated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments
and works of art and science," and (e) plunder of public or private property.
O'Brien, supra note 85, at 646.
106. Under the Nuremburg Charter, they consist of:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or per-
secutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in con-
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, w hether or
not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
NURE.MURG CHARTER art. 6(c). Control Council Law No. 10, which permitted the
prosecution of lower-level Nazis following Nuremburg, dropped the reference to the
war, leaving "[a]trocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country vhere
perpetrated." Schabas, supra note 4, at 738-39 (quoting Punishnwnt of Persons
Guilt, of War Crhnes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Control Council
Law 10, at art. 11(c) (Dec. 20,1945)).
107. Wexler argues that genocide is "clearly and authoritatively defined" by the
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
B. Charging Authority
Having addressed the question of what charges should be within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it is necessary to determine who can
file them. There are several options, which can be broken down into
three major categories: charging by individuals or States, charging by
the United Nations, or charging by the Tribunal itself.
Most theorists take for granted that the Tribunal itself should
have a prosecutorial role. The Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals have
investigative and prosecutive arms, as well as an adjudicative court.""
But this is neither an inevitable nor a desirable result. An independ-
ent prosecutorial body would raise substantial problems of account-
ability, political bias and abuse of authority.
The obvious alternative is charging by the United Nations, either
by the General Assembly or the Security Council. But these propos-
als also suffer from serious flaws. Following World War II, proposals
for an international war crimes court included provisions that allowed
the U.N. General Assembly to file complaints."1 The General As-
sembly is, numerically, the most representative body in international
law. "It has primary authority [in] matters of human rights and re-
1948 Genocide Convention. Wexler, supra note 3, at 696. But in the Yugoslav and
Rwandan Tribunal Statutes it is nebulously defined as "various acts, including kill-
ing, causing serious bodily harm, and imposing measures to prevent procreation,
which are 'committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group as such."' Cohen, supra note 32, at 148 (citing the STA'ItrrE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE
FOR SERIOUS VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LA\W COMMITrED IN
THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991 art. 4 (last amended May
13, 1998) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL]).
O'Brien contends that the statute actually only defines genocide as an act that falls
into the category of crimes against humanity, and that crimes again!;t humanity, not
"genocide," is the true charging offense. O'Brien, supra note 85, at 645, 647
("Genocide-the attempt to destroy a group in whole or in part-is a special case of
crimes against humanity.").
108. "Crimes against peace" was charged in Nuremburg and Tokyo, but is con-
spicuously absent from the Yugoslav charter. "Crimes against peace" consist of
"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, cr a war in viola-
tion of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a com-
mon plan or conspiracy to accomplish such acts." NUREMBURG CHARTER art. 6(a);
see Cohen, supra note 32, at 161-62.
109. NUREMBURG CHARTER arts. 6(a) & 6(c). That conspiracy is a separate
charging offense is often not recognized by scholars focusing on these issues. Cohen,
supra note 32, at 118-21.
110. Lepper, supra note 31, at 413. The Yugoslav tribunal has an elected inde-
pendent prosecutor with roughly seventy staffers.
111. Wexler, supra note 3, at 723 (discussing a 1951 draft statute).
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sidual competence in matters of international peace and security.""'
In theory, a charge from the General Assembly is immune from criti-
cisms of "elite" or "Western" morality, as Western countries are sig-
nificantly outnumbered. But this could also be the problem. The
General Assembly is dominated by undeveloped Third World na-
tions, many of which are dogmatically anti-Western. The possibility
of political "show trials" is intolerably great and would alienate the
developed world, without whose patronage the Tribunal could not
function.
The problems with charging by the General Assembly are well
recognized. Consequently, most current proposals involve charging
(or ratification of charges) by the Security Council. In the model
pushed by the United States in Rome, the Security Council would
have the power to block submissions regarding crimes against peace,
and complaints based on aggression would be preceded by a Security
Council determination that aggression is present,"' which, of course,
would make conviction a fait accompli. Some scholars believe that
the right to prosecute war criminals is firmly established in the Secu-
rity Council under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter."'
The problem is that the Security Council is also a political body,
and it is distinctly possible that meritorious charges would be
quashed.1'5 Allowing the Security Council to participate directly
would insulate the permanent members from war crimes charges.17r
Worse, the Security Council could subvert the entire charging proc-
ess. China, for example, is particularly vocal on issues of sovereignty.
A recurring Chinese veto would smother the Tribunal before it had a
chance to breathe.
A better alternative-the one we endorse here-is to move out-
side the realm of international institutions altogether. The United
112. Blakesley, supra note 55.
113. Wexler, supra note 3, at 722. Professor Wexler considers this to bz, a signifi-
cant problem with the draft statute.
114. D'Amato, supra note 47, at 79.
115. See, e.g., Wexier, supra note 3, at 723 ("It is not possible to maintain the
Court's independence if the Security Council, which is a political organ, can stop
proceedings because it is taking action under Chapter VII" of the U.N. Charter.): see
also Blakesley, supra note 55 ("The relationship between the Court and the Security
Council could undermine the judicial independence and integrity of the Court or the
sovereign equality of states.").
116. Kenneth Roth, Sidelined on Human Rights: America Bows Out, FOREIG\4
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 2, 3-4. On the other hand, the politicization of charging de-
cisions is probably inevitable.
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Nations (or some other funding authority) could institute and fund
the Permanent War Crimes Tribunal system, but (as with the Interna-
tional Court of Justice) leave disputes to individual States. This limi-
tation would encourage membership but may restrict prosecution."'
As it stands, the Tribunal already relies on States to act as enforcers:
"it is largely dependent on State Parties for assistance with respect to
the investigation of offenses, the arrest of suspects, the location and
procurement of evidence and witnesses, and the enforcement and
recognition of its judgments. 118 This begs the question of why the
aforementioned State Parties should not simply press the action on
their own behalf, rather than relying on an International Attorney
General.
A regime in which individual States can bring war crimes charges
before the Permanent War Crimes Tribunal is, essentially, a "private
attorney general" system,"9 as opposed to the "international attorney
general" system envisioned by most commentators. In the private at-
torney general system, a State or coalition of States (e.g., the Allies)
could bring charges before the Tribunal, at the charging party's ex-
pense. This places much of the cost of prosecuting war crimes on the
shoulders of the entities that feel most strongly about it-the victors
(the United States), the victims (Bosnia-Hercegovina) or nations that
feel a particular wrong more acutely (Israel)-and thus should re-
strain, at least to some degree, the filing of frivolous charges. The in-
ternational community only provides a forum (the Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal) and a defense. This is a more appropriate division
of costs and burdens than is a system in which the court acts as both
prosecutor and judge.
Investigation, similarly, would be funded by the State prosecu-
tor, rather than by the United Nations, though it could be performed
under U.N. auspices. There appears to be a domestic appetite for
such activities: "At the onset [sic] of the 102nd Congres;, several bills
were immediately introduced urging the establishment of an interna-
tional military tribunal to prosecute President [Saddam] Hussein and
his subordinates for war crimes during the invasion of Kuwait, missile
attacks against Israel, and the capture and alleged mi;treatment of
117. Blakesley, supra note 55.
118. Wexler, supra note 3, at 703-05.
119. The private attorney general system, which exists in some form in most com-
mon law countries, "rests upon the recognition that privately-initiated lawsuits are
often essential to the effectuation of... fundamental public policies." Baggett v.
Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 142 (1982).
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prisoners of war."' These calls were renewed in the 105th Con-
gress," and recent French legislation would have permitted the
prosecution of Rwandans accused of crimes against humanity."
The Yugoslav and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals have been
hamstrung by their inability to apprehend the major indicted war
criminals. The tribunals cannot enforce their indictments directly,
nor can they rely on the U.N. peace-keeping forces. The Yugoslav
tribunal even reduced sentences to encourage those accused of war
crimes to surrender.' This fact, which would be laughable were it
not so depressing, demonstrates that a "State prosecutor" is the pref-
erable solution. If the United States wishes to bring Radovan Karad-
zic or Saddam Hussein before the Permanent War Crimes Tribunal.
it must be willing to capture him and present him to the Tribunal.
Otherwise, the Tribunal will rapidly lose legitimacy and become an
exercise in Western moral posturing. A State should not be allowed
to bring charges unless it has apprehended (or can apprehend) the
accused. Also, as a check, States would not be allowed to simply pre-
sent charges directly to the Trial Panel. The Indictment Panel must
first decide whether a prosecution should go forward. Only then will
a defendant be formally indicted.
The State-as-prosecutor concept should not be overextended to
allow anyone to file a war crimes suit. There are good arguments in
favor of private charging. Such a rule would certainly bring more war
criminals to the Tribunal. Because financial penalties would be
among the sanctions that the Tribunal is authorized to impose, there
is a built-in incentive for victims and activists to seek relief. Also,
such a rule would enhance the Tribunal's ability to hear cases re-
garding "internal" conflicts (e.g., Bosnian Muslim versus Bosnian
Serb).
120. Cavicchia, supra note 49, at 232; see H.L CON. RES. 66, 102d Cong., 137
Cong. Rec. H6S4 (1991); S. CON. REs. 7, 102d Cong., 137 Cong. Rec. S1286-,I7
(1991); S. RES. 15, 102d Cong., 137 Cong. Rec. S1007 (1991).
121. The House voted 396 to 3; the Senate voted 93 to 0. The resolutions author-
ize 3 million dollars for an Iraqi war crimes tribunal. Eric Schmitt, Senate Wants
Saddam Tried for War Crines, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., March 14, 1998. at A07 job-
serving that "naming Saddam a war criminal would complicate negotiating vith
him").
122. French prosecutors, however, apparently demonstrated a "lack of enthusi-
asm" for pursuing such charges. Wexler, supra note 3, at 709.
123. Croat's Term Halved in Massacre Case, supra note 82, at A13 (Drazen Erde-
movic's sentence for his role in a 1995 massacre of unarmed Muslims was reduced
from 10 years to 5).
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On the other hand, there is some fear that the Tribunal could be
paralyzed by an overloaded docket if individuals are given an oppor-
tunity to bring their own cases to it. 4 Also, strictly speaking, interna-
tional law does not operate directly on individuals or non-
governmental organizations;" they would therefore lack standing be-
fore the Tribunal. Finally, the possibility of politically-motivated
charges is greatly enhanced if non-governmental organizations can
participate in charging and prosecuting war crimes. Ort balance, it is
better to restrict charging authority to States. This does not, of
course, prevent States from sponsoring charges raised by non-State
actors.
C. The Panels
The very existence of the Tribunal will represent a final repudia-
tion of the notion, proposed following World War I, that an individ-
ual has the right to be judged according to domestic law and by his
countrymen. 6 To maintain popular respect for war crimes judg-
ments, it is necessary to constantly emphasize the extraordinary na-
ture of the Tribunal and the crimes it prosecutes." Most would agree
that "[p]erpetrators of atrocities in internal wars should not be
treated more leniently than those engaged in international wars."'"
Our moral approval of this position can not allow us to deny that
State sovereignty shields internal conflicts from meaningful interna-
tional scrutiny. 9 This is the price the international system must ac-
cept in order to maintain a system in which the integrity of weaker
States is respected by the strong.
To promote national reconciliation in war-torn States and guar-
antee due process to accused war criminals, we propose a Tribunal
that consists of four independent but interrelated panel3: the Indict-
ment Panel, which would review charges brought by State prosecu-
tors and determine whether they reach the stringent standard neces-
sary to go forward with a trial; the Truth and Reconciliation Panel,
124. Jamison, supra note 28, at 439.
125. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 42, at 43-45.
126. Wexler, supra note 3, at 671.
127. See Martins, supra note 35, at 685.
128. Meron, supra note 53, at 83.
129. "[Tlhe law of war is based on the distinction between international armed
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts." Hans-Peter Gasser, International
Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and
Lebanon, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 911, 911 (1982).
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where confessed war criminals would engage in a process of public
revelation that would, hopefully, meaningfully contribute to the re-
generation of the damaged society; the Trial Panel, where defendants
who refuse to participate in the truth and reconciliation process
would be tried; and the Appeals Panel, which would hear challenges
to decisions by the other three panels. Each panel would be staffed,
presumably on a rotating basis, by appointed judges of international
stature.
1. The Indictment Panel
The Indictment Panel would decide the threshold question of
whether to indict an accused war criminal. State prosecutors, armed
with charging evidence gathered independently, would petition the
Indictment Panel. The Indictment Panel would review the evidence
presented by any interested party, though a State prosecutor's appli-
cation would be necessary to begin the process. Considering the
gravity of the offenses charged, the standard of proof would be high,
though not as high as the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard em-
ployed by the Trial Panel.
Current proposals envision the U.N. Security Council in this
role. This recognizes the fact that war crimes charges have significant
political implications and allows the Great Powers the opportunity to
halt prosecutions that may harm global strategic interests." How-
ever, the taint of partiality renders review by an independent body
preferable.
2. The Truth and Reconciliation Panel
This is perhaps the most unusual aspect of our proposed Perma-
nent War Crimes Tribunal. The Truth and Reconciliation Panel's
130. See Roth, supra note 116, at 3-5.
131. Michael Scharf also proposed a permanent international truth commission.
Scharf, supra note 63. By "truth commissions," he means entities that -investigate
situations and submit reports of their findings but have no power to impose criminal
fines or sentences." His version of the truth commission would function independ-
ently of, but in tandem with, the permanent international war crimes court- amnesty
would not be granted in exchange for participation. Id. at 375. His useful paper also
includes a draft statute. Id. The chief prosecutor for the Yugoslaxian %,ar crimes tri-
bunal has recently called for the creation of a truth commission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Richard J. Goldstone, Ethnic Reconciliation Need the Help cof a Truth
Commission, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 24, 1998, at 6 ("The [war crimes] tribunal can
tell an important part of the story, but it is equally important that the people come to
their own consensus about their recent history and ackno%%ledge the abuse', suffered
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mandate would be, essentially, to manage and oversee a unique form
of plea-bargain. Once a defendant is referred to the Tribunal by the
Indictment Panel, he is faced with two alternatives: (1) he can con-
test the charges against him and face trial, or (2) he can plead guilty
and bare himself before the Truth and Reconciliatior Panel. This
Panel, though judicial in nature, would not sit in judgment, instead, it
would oversee and administer a rigorous process of self-revelation by
the confessed war criminal. At the end of the process, t:he Truth and
Reconciliation Panel would, in effect, absolve the defendant. This
might preclude any further international prosecution for the crimes
confessed or simply limit the sentences handed down by the Trial
Panel. It would necessarily bar prosecution at the national level.
The idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Panel is not new; South
Africa, Uganda, El Salvador, Argentina, Haiti, Bolivia, the Philip-
pines, Chad, Ethiopia, the Balkans, Guatemala, Somalia and Chile
have all experimented with truth commissions." South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 1995, is the
most successful example. Perhaps too successful: South Africa's
ruling African National Congress has temporarily blocked the release
of the Commission's final report, which identifies the ANC as a
"gross human rights violator" during the apartheid era." South Af-
rica's Commission functions as a purely investigative body, except
that it has the power to grant amnesty to those who present them-
selves before it and to hold those that refuse to appear in contempt.'
by all victims. That is the goal of the proposed [truth and reconciliation] commis-
sion."). Additionally, a distinguished group of statesmen and scholars endorsed, in
Yugoslavia, the creation of a non-amnesty-based truth commission. THE REPORT OF
THE CENTURY FOUNDATION/TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TA'K FORCE ON
APPREHENDING INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS: MAKING JUSTICE WORN 12 (1998). The
commission would complement the criminal prosecutions before the; war crimes tri-
bunal and promote reconciliation by creating an accurate historical record and pro-
viding the victims of the conflict with catharsis. Id. The endorsers of such a commis-
sion are Morton Abramowitz, Oscar Arias, Dr. Michael Berenbaum, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, Edmond Browning, Hodding Carter III, Paula Dobriansky, Monroe
Leigh, Bette Bao Lord, Jose Maria Mendiluce, Julia Ormond, Rabbi David Saper-
stein, John Silber, Senator Paul Simon, Lt. Gen. DeWitt Smith Jr., Helmut Sonnen-
feldt, Susan Sontag, William Taft IV and Cyrus Vance. Though this is an impressive
group, the model they propose is fundamentally flawed. As we discu;s below, a truth
and reconciliation panel can only work if it is able to offer some form of amnesty to
participants.
132. See Scharf, supra note 63.
133. Apartheid Report Blocked as Judge Considers Appeal, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Oct. 29, 1998, at A13.
134. Doctors Say Botha Too Sick for Trial, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 31,
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Reparations, calculated by the Commission, are paid by the State,
rather than by the confessor."3 s The Tribunal's Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Panel would have a somewhat similar function. It would admin-
ister and facilitate the defendant's confession, engage in independent
investigation as necessary and set damages.
The Truth and Reconciliation Panel is intended to promote na-
tional healing." s It is true that the Panel may paper over differences,
rather than heal rifts. We are aware that "when the choice is too eas-
ily made in the direction of overlooking criminal conduct in the serv-
ice of national reconciliation, the moral and political costs are
high."' But we submit that the international costs of a national so-
cial collapse are higher still and tilt the balance decisively in favor of
efforts to promote national reconciliation, even at the cost of
thwarting individual retributive justice. Wole Soyinka observed, of
Africans in general, "Rwanda is our nightmare, South Africa is our
dream."'" As a first step toward the development of a new paradigm
for international war crimes courts, it is necessary to understand why
the truth and reconciliation efforts underway in South Africa are so
much more successful than the war crimes prosecutions underway in
Rwanda and Tanzania.
Former South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha understood
that the most powerful forces jeopardizing the existence of an organi-
zation under threat come from the leadership itself. In 1984, Botha
observed: "There is only one element that can break the Afrikaner,
and that is the Afrikaner himself. It is when the Afrikaner, like a ba-
boon shot in the stomach, pulls out his own intestines. We must
1998, at B03 ("Botha, 82, is due in court April 14 to face charges of contempt for re-
fusing to appear before the statutory Truth and Reconciliation Commission .....
135. See Wexler, supra note 3, at 711-12 nn.247-48.
136. See id. at 711-12. ("The debate whether legal prosecution or some other
method, such as lustration, or South Africa's ongoing experiment with a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is a better vehicle to promote national reconciliation (at
least enough to permit the reestablishment of coexistence without xarfareI is ongo-
ing."); see also Goldstone, supra note 131, at 6 ("In addition to criminal prosecutions,
it is necessary for a damaged society to arrive at a wider understanding of the causes
of its sufferings .... Through the [truth and reconciliation] commission, Bosnians
could figure out how former neighbors and friends were driven to inflict such e.il
upon one another.").
137. Floyd Abrams & Diane F. Orentlicher, In Cambodia, as in Bosnia, Issie is
Punish or Pardon, Los ANGELES TmIEs, Sept. 15, 1996, at M0L.
138. Robert B. Edgerton, Darkness Visible, NAT'L REv., June 22, 199S., at 57, 58.
Soyinka, a Nobel-prize-minning novelist and advocate of ethnic independence, %vas
hanged by Sani Abacha's regime in Nigeria.
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guard against that."'139 Nelson Mandela showed that he understood
Botha's speech perhaps better than Botha himself when he created
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. While
Botha himself refused to appear before the Commission, countless
others have and continue to do so. The result has been one of the
most successful peaceful transitions to democracy in the modern era.
There are four chief virtues to the Truth and Reconciliation
Panel. First, the Truth and Reconciliation Panel capitalizes on the
power and influence of leaders and figureheads. When a wartime
leader publicly recants on an international stage, before panelists of
recognized importance, the system he represents loses a degree of le-
gitimacy even in the eyes of his most ardent supporters. De-
legitimating past systems may be as important to a successful transi-
tion to stable peace as validating new ones. When a faction's elite
figures formally admit that their ways were mistaken or morally
wrong, it is difficult for reactionaries to rally around them. Major ob-
stacles to the acceptance of a new national regime are greatly eased.
At the same time, their behaviors will now be codified as violations
of the laws of war.
Second, the Truth and Reconciliation Panel, a neutral interna-
tional body without a retributive function, successfully avoids the
charge of "victor's justice." While some might be unhappy with the
indictment of their leaders before any court, calls to violence in the
face of an ultimately benign international body lack much force:
[A]n international truth commission can guarantee neutrality in a
highly polarized environment. Many of the past national truth
commissions have been accused of partisanship, having commis-
sioners politically beholden to the current administration, or being
unabashedly pro-government or regionally biased. To be perceived
as fair, a truth commission should establish its independence from
all the actors in a contested history. It must have the moal author-
ity to examine and judge the acts and motivations of others. A
geographically diverse international truth commission is much more
likely to be perceived as objective and disinterested than a national
truth commission. Moreover, there would be a greater sense of le-
gitimacy derived from the international community's involvement,
as well as greater international attention to the work of such an in-
stitution, thus increasing pressure for the parties within the country
to cooperate with the Commission's work and impleme-at its rec-
139. P.W. Botha, Speech (Apr. 26, 1984).
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ommendations. +
Those appearing before the Truth and Reconciliation Panel agree to
abjure their past and explain their conduct in their own words. They
are not required to reject their constituents; merely to concede that
their policies, however well-meaning, were disastrously wong. Par-
ticipation before the Truth and Reconciliation Panel would be a
graphic and potentially powerful demonstration of a desire to estab-
lish peaceful coexistence rather than seek revenge.
Third, the Truth and Reconciliation Panel deflects guilt and
blame from populations to the individuals responsible. The process
of allowing the guilty to confess, identify others who cooperated in
their crimes against humanity and admit the acts were wrong and
unjustified links deeds to faces and names. This eliminates the dan-
ger of an abstract indictment of a people: "Milosevic" rather than
"the Serbs"; "P.W. Botha" rather than "the Afrikaners" or "the
Whites"; "G6ebbels" not "Germans."'' Furthermore, if responsibil-
ity for what happened in the former Yugoslavia is not individualized:
[G]uilt will remain collective, thus marking whole nations for dec-
ades or even centuries to come. This could degenerate into frustra-
tion, resentment and the desire for revenge, potentially leading to a
vicious circle of new wars and new crimes.... [Tjhere will be no
peace in the Balkans until those who committed and inspired these
horrendous crimes are identified and prosecuted.M
Fourth, the Panel establishes a firm and early precedent of fair
and unprejudiced action. It offers a functioning model of self-aware
reconciliation for the recovering civil society. At the same time, the
Tribunal offers a paradigm of criminal justice for defendants who re-
fuse to participate in the truth and reconciliation process.
The Tribunal's structure as a whole is intended to explicitly favor
participation in the truth and reconciliation process. The beginning
of this process, following indictment and reference to the Tribunal by
the Indictment Panel, is an agreement to confess-a plea bargain, or
a guilty plea. This raises problems of its own, since the bargain struck
140. Scharf. supra note 63, at 381 (footnotes omitted).
141. See Goldstone, supra note 131, at 6 ("The important role that jurists can play
is in apportioning individual blame for criminal acts, repudiating those %,ho vould
cast blame on entire ethnic groups. Too many people in the former Yugoslaia still
blame Serbs or Croats or Muslims for their suffering.").
142. Mirki Klarin, The Moral Case for a War Crimes Tribunal, WALL S-. J. E. n.,
Mar. 17,1994, at S.
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may not satisfy the direct victims of the defendant. Thus, for the
Truth and Reconciliation Panel to function effectively, it must have
credibility and clearly-described international powers, as well as
some mechanism (e.g., recompense) to partially satisfy the individu-
als wronged. Most importantly, it must be able to subpoena, inde-
pendently investigate claims and statements, refer recalcitrant defen-
dants to the Trial Panel, operate in tandem with other ongoing efforts
to aid wide-ranging reconstruction of the States harmed by the war at
issue and offer broad and real protection to those who testify before
it.
A local Truth and Reconciliation Commission, like South Af-
rica's, is not an adequate substitute for an international panel. Par-
ticularly in the immediate wake of armed conflict, impartiality is im-
possible to establish domestically. Participants in domestic truth and
reconciliation efforts have too much power to short circuit the proc-
ess, possibly re-igniting violence. In August 1997, for example, for-
mer Deputy President Frederik de Klerk withdrew his statements
from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
threatened to sue the organization after Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
a supporter of the African National Congress, publicly criticized de
Klerk's testimony.43 A truly independent, international panel whose
existence is not contingent on the outcome of a particular conflict and
whose members were appointed well before the conflict at issue be-
gan will deflect accusations of conflicts of interest.
The safety of witnesses and defendants is crucial to the Truth
and Reconciliation Panel's function. If people are too afraid to tes-
143. See David D. Newsom, A Crucial Few Weeks for South Africa's Truth Seek-
ers, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 13, 1997, at 19. De Klerk did in fact sue the
Commission, seeking removal of the Chair and Deputy Chair, but withdrew his
charge of "statements unbecoming to his office" after Deputy Chairman Dr. Alex
Boraine and Chairman Archbishop Desmond Tutu publicly apologized on Septem-
ber 5, 1997. They stated that the Commission is "deeply concerned at the percep-
tion" that the remarks "reflected negatively on its objectivity and impartiality,"
adding that the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act bound the
commission "to function without political or other bias." De Klerk's Party Ends Suit
Against South Africa's Truth Panel, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1997, at A07. Ironically, de
Klerk's charge gave the Truth and Reconciliation Commission a special opportunity
to reaffirm its impartiality and, therefore, its legitimacy. A working Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission, whether permanent or ad hoc, must expect charges such as
de Klerk's from defendants maneuvering to deflect attention from themselves and
discredit the Commission in the process. The fact that the Truth and Reconciliation
Panel will be a permanent, functioning component of a larger Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal will help deflate such charges.
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tify, the Truth and Reconciliation Panel will become a useless alter-
native to trial. This is a very real concern. Many Rwandan witnesses
are so concerned about their safety that they have made their testi-
mony contingent upon relocation. " The murder of Emmanuel Ru-
dasingwa and several of his family members only weeks before he
was to testify against the former mayor of Taba, Jean-Paul Akasevu,
demonstrates that these fears are well-founded. More than two hun-
dred Rwandan genocide victims were killed in 1997 before they could
testify in court.' 5 The consequences of failing to protect witnesses go
beyond the obvious operational difficulty of prosecuting when your
witnesses are dead. True to our earlier observation, parties are in-
clined to use violence when they believe they are guaranteed to lose
all. Murder of witnesses only inflames an already grave situation.
Accordingly, an international treaty creating the Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal must include provisions that guarantee States will
not seek to prosecute defendants who were investigated and par-
doned by the Panel, and signatory States must be prepared to offer
broad international asylum to witnesses and potential witnesses. In
extreme cases, it might be reasonable to designate participants as
presumptive political refugees.
3. The Trial Panel
As noted, the Trial Panel will try indicted war criminals who ref-
use to participate in the process overseen by the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Panel or who are referred by the Truth and Reconciliation
Panel. Of course, due process must be satisfied. In this respect, the
Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals,' as well as the proposed tribunal
144. See Chris McGreal, Witnesses Afraid to Speak: Surn'ivors of Rivandan Geno-
cide Due to Appear in Court Accuse Tribunal of Failing to Protect Them, Gt ARDIVN
(London), Jan. 21, 1997, at 12.
145. Rudasingwa's .vife refused to testify at all, claiming that it was too risky.
"'Everybody could see who was being interviewed,"' she said. "I told myself. 'if
that's the way it's going to be, I'm not going to do it."' Rudasingwa himself appar-
ently requested protection; he was told to call investigators if he was attacked,
though there was no telephone within tventy miles of his home. Additionally,
though the bulk of the investigation into Akaseyu's activities took place in Taba.
Rwanda, the Rwandan tribunal's witness-protection division is located in Arusha,
Tanzania, where it provides little real protection. Alan Zarembo, Rwanda's Geno-
cide Witnesses Are Killed as Wheels of Justice Slowly Begin Turning, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1997, at 7; see also Colum Lynch, UN War Tribunal Indicts Mayor
in Rwanda Rapes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1997, at A04.
146. The Yugoslav statute, from which the Rwandan statute was drawn, offers "a
robust framework of due process." Martins, supra note 35, at 673.
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
discussed at the Rome conference, offer a useful guide. The interna-
tional community has a demonstrable incentive to promote societal
healing over individual prosecutions, and thus would much prefer to
see indicted war criminals plea bargain before the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Panel. If they do not, the potential sanctions should be se-
vere. A convicted war crimes defendant, having refused the oppor-
tunity to confess and participate meaningfully in the rehabilitation of
his society (or that of his victims), is not deserving of lenience. For
that reason, punishments (discussed below) should be severe.
The Trial Panel, like all war crimes tribunals to date, will be typi-
fied by the intermingling of civil and criminal law systems."7 As with
the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals, a defendant will be considered
innocent until proven guilty' beyond a reasonable doubt in the eyes
of a majority of the judges on the Panel.149 The defendant will have
the right to counsel of his choosing, at the prosecutor's expense."
In terms of trial procedure, the Trial Panel will la-cgely emulate
common law courts. Adversarial procedures are considered a neces-
sary element of due process to common lawyers.'' In addition, the
adversarial system is better for the resolution of issues of fact and
confers greater protection to the accused. Thus, a defendant will not
be compelled to testify against himself'52 and will enjoy the right of
confrontation:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses can-
not be proved against an accused ... except by witnesses who con-
front him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried,
whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may
impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules gov-
erning the trial or conduct of criminal cases.'53
147. Cohen, supra note 32, at 163.
148. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL YUGOSLAV VAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL art. 21,
para. 3.
149. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA RULES
OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 87, 102(A) (July 1998) [hereinafter [NTERNATIONAL
YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL RULES].
150. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL art. 21,
para. 4(d).
151. See Jamison, supra note 28, at 444 ("Use of the inquisitorial approach could
prevent these [common law] nations, particularly the U.S., from participating in the
court, and thus would undermine the court's existence.").
152. STATUTE OFTHE INTERNATIONAL YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL art. 21,
para. (4)(e).
153. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47,55 (1899).
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This is not an Anglo-American invention: "it was not the custom of
the Romans to give up anyone before the accused met the accusers
face to face, and had opportunity to make his defense concerning the
charge laid against him."'  The logic of the Tribunal as a whole is in-
consistent with trials in absentia: the defendant's participation in or
rejection of the Truth and Reconciliation process presupposes his
presence before the Tribunal.'s'
Trials in absentia are anathema to common law systems. Some
of the arguments against trials in absentia apply to Continental crimi-
nal justice systems, which accept such trials to a far greater degree.
The point is that there may be a tendency in the world community to
adopt a European model for the war crimes tribunal. Trial in absen-
tia, however, raises serious problems for those from the common law
or adversarial model of criminal justice. Trials in absentia, moreover,
necessarily violate Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes the right of any accused
"[tlo be tried in his presence."'
As with the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals, the defenses of
diminished capacity and insanity will be available."" "The defense's
evidence should be evaluated in light of, among other things, the exi-
gency of the situation, the requirements of military discipline,
whether the accused could have had subjective or objective knowl-
edge of the order's lawfulness, and whether the rule of law, at issue
was controversial."'' L
4. The Appeals Panel
In our proposal, as with the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals,
the accused will have the right to appeal decisions by any of the other
panels. "9 This includes the right to challenge the Indictment Panel's
initial decision to refer the matter to the Tribunal."' The Appeals
154. Acts 25:16.
155. They are not, however, unprecedented. Martin Bormann was charged and
sentenced to death in absentia at Nuremburg. Cohen, supra note 32, at 119 n.15.
156. Blakesley, supra note 55.
157. See Wise, supra note 93, at 315; INTERNATIONAL YUGOSLW VAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL RuLEs 67(A)(ii)(b) (defendants must give advance notice of "any special
defense, including that of diminished or lack of mental responsibility.").
158. O'Brien, supra note 85, at 645.
159. LNTERNATIONAL YUGOSLAV VAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL RuLES 87, 102(A).
160. This is also true in the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals: "the Yugoslav tri-
bunal is accountable to the defendants, who are not prohibited from challenging its
authority (as they were under the Nuremburg Charter)." O'Brien, supra note $5, at
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Panel will hear appeals alleging errors on a dispositive question of
law and errors of fact that occasion a miscarriage of justice'16 Obvi-
ously, members of the Appeals Panel should not have been involved
in the work of the Indictment, Tnth and Reconciliation or Trial Pan-
els.
162
D. Punishing Convicted War Criminals
War crimes tribunals exist in large measure to satisfy the anger
of victims.63 Their anger is generally satisfied by the death of the
convicted:
[T]he heart of such crimes almost invariably involves intentional
homicide, aggravated by elements of racial or ethnic persecution,
gratuitous suffering and multiple offenses.... Indeed, we classify
them as war crimes and crimes against humanity precisely because
of their seriousness. And for this reason, in the past, offenders have
been regularly if not customarily punished with loss of their lives."
While capital punishment may initially appear inconsistent with the
goals of the Truth and Reconciliation Panel, it is in fact the only way
to ensure the functioning of the Tribunal.
Those who argue that the death penalty should not be available
in war crimes cases1 65 are wrong. Part of this opposition is visceral:
Schabas writes that "executions [in Nuremburg] were carried out
within weeks of the conviction, in the Nuremburg prison gymnasium,
by an American hangman whose technical mastery was criticized, and
which undoubtedly brought about superfluous suffering to the con-
demned criminals."1" On reflection, though, it is difficult to muster
much sympathy for the "superfluous suffering" of Gbering, Gbeb-
bels, Streicher et al. To the extent that indicted defendants wish to
contribute to the recovery of victimized societies, they can participate
in the truth and reconciliation process; those that do not should be
faced with the stark choice of acquittal (and vindication) or convic-
tion (and possibly death).
643.
161. See Blakesley, supra note 55.
162. See Jamison, supra note 28, at 448.
163. See Blakesley, supra note 55.
164. Schabas, supra note 4, at 769.
165. See Jamison, supra note 28, at 451. ("U.N. sponsored executions may seem
hypocritical to the purpose and scope of the court."). The ABA 'ask Force 1992
proposal and the ILC Draft Statute (1993) also oppose the death peralty. Id. at 441.
166. Schabas, supra note 4, at 737.
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The death penalty remains accepted in the United States" and
elsewhere.' The locus of opposition is peculiarly European, and
rests on the notion that a human government has no right to take that
which is God's, e.g., a human life. However, Christian doctrine by no
means rules out the death penalty: "the commandment forbidding
killing was not broken by those... who have imposed the death-
penalty on criminals when representing the authority of the State in
accordance with the laws of the State, the justest and most reasonable
source of power."" 9  Unless we doubt the justness of trying war
criminals at all, it is difficult to see why the death penalty should be
forbidden.
The international community has a strong and legitimate interest
in deterring war crimes.7 1 Historically, it is quite clear that interna-
tional law permits war criminals to be executed:
It was said at the time [of the Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals]
that '[i]nternational law lays down that a war criminal may be pun-
ished with death whatever crime he may have committed.' The
1940 United States Army Manual Rules of Land Warfare declared
that '[a]ll war crimes are subject to the death penalty, although a
lesser penalty may be imposed.' A post-war Norwegian court, in
answering a defendant's plea that the death penalty did not apply
to the offense charged because it had been abolished for such a
crime under domestic law, found that violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war had always been punished by death under international
law.
171
167. See, e.g., The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2401 (196) (formallv
adding war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions to the list of fed-
eral death penalty offenses).
168. "Eager to hang convicted murderers, four leading Caribbean countries have
agreed to form their own high court, abandoning a colonial system that made Britain
their final legal arbiter." Michelle Faul, Caribbean Nations Are Impatient for Hang-
ing Justice, SAN FRANcIsCO CHRON.. July 4, 1998, at A10. The citizens of Barbado,,.
Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica strongly support the death penalty. but
British courts are subject to EU decrees that consider capital punishment "a viola-
tion of human rights." Id.; see also Schabas, supra note 4, at 746 (noting the strong
support for capital punishment in the Islamic world, as well as in the United States).
169. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD bk. I at 21 (Henry Bettenson trans., 1934) (firt
published 1467; dated 426 A.D.); accord JOHN CAL\IN, I, STITUTES UF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION 782 (John Allen trans., 1936) (1536) ("The magistrate does not
act at all from himself, but merely executes the judgments of God.... We can find
no objection to the infliction of public vengeance, unless the justice of God be re-
strained from the punishment of crimes.").
170. See D'Amato, supra note 47. at 503.
171. See Schabas, supra note 4, at 735 (citing 15 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
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Suggestions to indulge the sensibilities of States opposed to the
death penalty, as by allowing them to "request" that the death pen-
alty not be imposed on their nationals or on war criminals they cap-
ture, miss the point.m72 Ultimately, the sensibilities of western Europe
are not the sensibilities we need to be concerned about: the Euro-
pean Union and the NATO alliance all but guarantee that the era of
western European conflict is over. The Tribunal must be more con-
cerned with the rest of the world.
In the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals, "it has already been de-
termined that the Tribunal will be prohibited from issuing a death
penalty sentence, and prison sentences will be carried out in any of
the countries which have offered use of prison space."'' - This makes
the tribunals largely a mockery. The indictees would face much
worse were they turned over to their enemies or victims!" "In the
Security Council, Rwanda claimed there would be a fundamental in-
justice in exposing criminals tried by its domestic courts with execu-
tion if those tried by the international tribunal-presumably the mas-
terminds of the genocide-would only be subject to life
imprisonment."'75 The Rwandan representative went on to explain
that the situation is not "conducive to national reconciliation in
Rwanda."' 76 He makes our point exactly, and it is diffictult to quibble
when it is the emissary of the victims that speaks. In announcing the
public execution of twenty-two perpetrators of genocide, the Rwan-
dan government explained that "the execution 'would act as a lesson
to people who do not respect the life [sic] of others' and would serve
as a warning to those 'still bent on pursuing genocide.'
1 77
The lack of a death penalty is not "progress in human rights
norms"'78 but a recipe for impotence. And it begs the obvious ques-
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 200 (1949), U.S. WAR
DEP'T, BASIC FIELD MANUAL: RULES OF LAND WARFARE 27-10, at 89 (1940) and
Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, 13 I.L.R. 262, 263-64 (Nor. 1946)).
172. See generally Schabas, supra note 4, at 752-53 (discussing possible changes in
death penalty provision of International Law Commission's statute for a proposed
international criminal court in order placate certain countries).
173. Jamison, supra note 28, at 429.
174. Capital punishment was available in the former Socialist Republic of Yugo-
slavia; genocide and war crimes were specifically punishable by de ath or a prison
sentence of over five years. See Schabas, supra note 4, at 763.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Simmons, supra note 88, at A13.
178. "There can be no more dramatic evidence of the progress and evolution of
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tion: if Croatia captures Radovan Karadzic, who may be directly re-
sponsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Croats, would it
be more inclined to turn him over to the tribunal (where he faces, at
most, life imprisonment in Western Europe) or try him in a domestic
court, where a death sentence can be imposed upon conviction? The
people of Rwanda have already answered that question: -Rwanda's
intention to execute those responsible for genocide has been well-
publicized, 17' and the victims have complained of the slow pace of
the proceedings.
The integrity of the entire process is shaken when victims do not
believe the international tribunal will provide just punishment. Their
demands are insistent, and they will be heard one way or another.
Rwanda is instructive:
'We don't see anything wrong or anything to be ashamed of in
trying to show the people that for once, the Rwandan government
is serious in punishing people who commit those kind of crimes,'
said Minister of State Patrick Mazimhaka....
All major human rights organizations have called on the gov-
ernment of President Pasteur Bizimungu to halt the executions
handed down for the genocide of more than a half a million people,
mostly minority Tutsis. U.N. human rights commissioner Mary
Robinson said the executions-the first since the trials began in
December 1996-did not adhere to international standards 'in
which all guarantees of due process are strictly observed.' ...
'I will come tomorrow to see if the man who cut me will be
executed,' said Claudette Mukaramanzi. A machete-made scar
runs from her left temple to her cheekbone. 'If he is killed, then I
can be happy.' The 18-year-old Tutsi is the only member of her
family to survive the massacre of more than 10,OJ0 people who had
human rights norms than in the fact that the first international war crimes tribunals,
created in the aftermath of the Second World War, made widespread use of the
death penalty and that their successors, created by the Security Council in 1q93 and
1994, prohibit it." Schabas, supra note 4, at 733. Perhaps this is why the World War
II era courts enjoyed such widespread success and acclaim, compared to the unim-
pressive showing of the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals to date.
179. Id. at 766; see also Raymond Bonner, Rwandans Divided on War-Crimes
Plan, N.Y. TIms, Nov. 2, 1994, at A04.
180. Simmons, supra note 88, at A13 ("Survivors of the genocide have complained
that the Rwandan government and a U.N. tribunal convened in Tanzania to try the
top organizers of the massacres have been painfully slow in deciding the genocide
cases."); see also McGreal, supra note 5, at 14 (The confidence of the %ictims in the
international tribunal has been "severely undermined.").
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sought refuge in the Roman Catholic Church in Nyamala, 15 miles
south of the capital, Kigali....
Standing beside mass graves containing the remains of his wife
and eight children, Joseph Buhiciro said the condemned would die
a death much more humane than those suffered by the victims.
'There is no pity for these people,' he said.1"'
With all due respect to U.N. Commissioner Mary Robinson,
quoted above, the constituency of the Tribunal should be people like
Ms. Mukaramanzi and Mr. Buhiciro. The Tribunal speaks to the so-
ciety sundered by violent conflict, not to international bureaucrats or
activists.
There is a serious danger that, absent a credible international
tribunal, local courts will take vengeance on prisoners without any
real concern for the fairness of the process or the "education" of pro-
spective war criminals."s The impulse to protect the rights of the ac-
cused is laudable, but it is also important to provide a measure of
punishment sufficient to satisfy the retributive needs of the popula-
tions subjected to war crimes by the defendants. "3 It is no surprise,
then, that Serbia refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the tribunal. "
Similarly, the Republika Srbska has declined to extradite accused war
criminals. 8
Without a death penalty, it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that modern war crimes tribunals are merely attempts to salve guilty
Western consciences."S This is where our proposed Tribunal differs.
181. Dianna Cahn, Rwanda Ignores Pleas of World to Halt Executions: Pope's
Appeal for Clemency Also Dismissed, SAN FRANcIsCO CHRON., Apr. 24, 1998, at
A12.
182. See, e.g., 'Dead' Muslims Found Alive, MARIN INDEP. J., Mar. 2, 1997, at A09
("Two Muslim brothers whose alleged murders led to a death sentence for a Bosnian
Serb soldier are alive and living in a Sarajevo suburb.... One of the alleged vic-
tims ... says he had no idea his name was even mentioned at a Bosnian government
trial in 1993, at which Sretko Damjanovic was convicted of war crimes and sentenced
to death.").
183. "After years of sadistic cruelty at the hands of lifelong neighbors, Bosnia's
ethnic groups could scarcely be expected to reunify as envisaged by [the Dayton ac-
cords]-or to refrain from violently settling scores-unless atrocious crimes were
judged by a credible process." Abrams & Orentlicher, supra note 137, at MO.
184. See Jamison, supra note 28, at 430.
185. See Cotic, supra note 98, at 235.
186. This hypothesis certainly goes a long way toward explaining the calls for a
war crimes court to investigate the atrocities perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge-of-
ten by the same intellectuals who fervently (and successfully) opposed Western mili-
tary intervention in Southeast Asia. See U.S. Wants U.N. Tribunal to Go After
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We offer the opportunity to put the regeneration of civil society
above the individual retributive demands of the victims. The defen-
dant can always refuse the bargain. He should do so, however, with
full knowledge that the Trial Panel's punishment need not be tem-
pered with mercy.
But not all war criminals deserve the death penalty:
Arguably, some war crimes and crimes against humanity do not
meet the 'most serious crimes' test. Many war crimes appear to be
little more than rules of good sportsmanship among combatants,
such as the perfidious use of the white flag or of uniforms of a neu-
tral party. Some war crimes listed as 'grave breaches' of the Ge-
neva Conventions and Protocol Additional-for example, 'compel-
ling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power,'
'willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial,' and 'appropriation of property, not justified by mili-
tary necessity'--probably do not meet such a standard. The same is
true of certain violations of the Convention for the Protection and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. These include i[florcibly
transferring children of [one particular] group to another group,'
'[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide,' as well as cer-
tain crimes against humanity, such as '[dieportation,'
'[i]mprisonment' and even rape.""
Because some war crimes should not be punished by death and
because the Permanent War Crimes Tribunal should have a deterrent
aspect, it is imperative that punishments be visible. A recognizable
international prison site (a "Devil's Island") would herald the world
community's resolve. Paradoxically, it could also become an endur-
ing symbol of international peace and justice.
IV. Conclusion
In this article, we have outlined the key features of a new and
different kind of Permanent War Crimes Court.
After the war is over, accused war criminals will be investigated
and charged by individual States. These States will present evidence
to an Indictment Panel, which in turn will decide whether to formally
indict the proposed defendant.
Once indicted, a defendant will be encouraged to submit to the
judgment of the Truth and Reconciliation Panel. The Panel offers a
Khmer Rouge: Leaders Could Face Genocide Charge, supra note 58, at A1.
187. Schabas, supra note 4, at 768-69.
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war-ravaged society the opportunity to forego vengeance in favor of
reconciliation.
In practice, we are proposing a form of ritualized plea bargain.
A defendant who does not wish to endure a war crimes trial or who
wishes to offer an apology may plead guilty and bare himself before
the Truth and Reconciliation Panel. He will be required to lay out
his misdeeds publicly and without embellishment before a neutral
body, before the eyes of the world and in full view of Hs victims and
allies. At the end, he will enjoy reduced punishment or amnesty and,
if necessary, exile.
A defendant who professes innocence or does not wish to be
confronted in this manner may refuse the offer. In that case, he will
be tried as a war criminal before the Trial Panel. There, he will ei-
ther be exonerated, or he will be convicted and conderaned. A con-
victed criminal's punishment will be severe; in appropriate cases, it
will be death.
At any step of the process, an Appeals Panel will stand ready to
correct errors of law or miscarriages of justice. In such a model, all of
the imperatives of an international war crimes court are satisfied. As
an institutional matter, the Tribunal favors reconciliation to revenge.
It is primarily dedicated to fostering peaceful norms and permanently
resolving disputes. It offers war criminals and warring factions the
opportunity to make lasting peace from positions of clear-eyed un-
derstanding. But it is also capable of exacting genuine and just retri-
bution: a steel fist beneath the velvet glove.
The United Nations will not adopt such a model in 1998. But the
time will soon come when the failure of the current-model war crimes
court is manifest. At that point, it will be time to revisit a proposal
for a Permanent International War Crimes Tribunal that provides
both national reconciliation and effective justice.
[Vol. 22:1
